AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY
CHAPTER XXIX
VON JAGOW, ZIMMERMANN, AND GERMAN-AMERICANS
Our train drew into the Berlin station on the evening of February 2, 1916. The
date is worth mentioning, for that marked an important crisis in German-American
relations. Almost the first man I met. was my old friend and colleague,
Ambassador James W. Gerard. Mr. Gerard told me that he was packing up and
expected to leave Berlin at any moment, for he believed that a break between
Germany and the United States was a matter only of days, perhaps of hours. At
that time Germany and the United States were discussing the settlement of the
Lusitania outrage. The negotiations had reached a point where the Imperial
Government had expressed a willingness to express her regrets, pay an indemnity,
and promise not to do it again. But the President and Mr. Lansing insisted that
Germany should declare that the sinking of the Lusitania had been an illegal
act. This meant that Germany at no time in the future could resume submarine
warfare without stultifying herself and doing something which her own government
had denounced as contrary to international law. But our government would accept
nothing less and the two nations were, therefore, at loggerheads.
"I can do nothing more," said Mr. Gerard. "I want to have you talk with
Zimmermann and Von Jagow, and perhaps you can give them a new point of view."
I soon discovered, from my many callers, that the atmosphere in Berlin was tense
and exceedingly anti-American. Our country was regarded everywhere as
practically an ally of the Entente, and I found that the most absurd ideas
prevailed concerning the closeness of our relations with England. Thus it was
generally believed that Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador in
Washington, met regularly with President Wilson's Cabinet and was consulted on
all our national policies.
At three o'clock Mr. Gerard took me to Von Jagow's house and we spent more than
an hour there with the Foreign Minister. Von Jagow was a small, slight man of
nervous disposition. He lighted cigarette after cigarette during our interview.
He was apparently greatly worried over the American situation. Let us not
suppose that the German Government regarded lightly a break with the United
States. At that time their newspapers were ridiculing and insulting us, and
making fun of the idea that Uncle Sam would go to war. The contrast between
these journalistic vapourings and the anxiety, even the fear, which this high
German official displayed, much impressed me. The prospect of having our men and
our resources thrown on the side of the Entente he did not regard indifferently,
whatever the Berlin press might say.
"It seems to us a shame that Mr. Lansing should insist that we declare the
Lusitania sinking illegal," Von Jagow began. "He is acting like a technical
lawyer."
"If you want the real truth," I replied, "I do not think that the United States
is particular or technical about the precise terms that you use. But you must
give definite assurances that you are sorry for the act, say that you regard it
as an improper one, and that it will not occur again. Unless you do this, the
United States will not be satisfied."
"We cannot do that," he answered. "Public opinion in Germany would not permit
it. If we should make a declaration such as you outline, the present Cabinet
would fall."
"But I thought that you had public opinion here well under control?" I answered.
"It may take a little time but certainly you can change public sentiment so that
it would approve such a settlement."
"As far as the newspapers are concerned," said Von Jagow, "that is true. We can
absolutely control them. However, that will take some time. The newspapers
cannot reverse themselves immediately; they will have to do it gradually, taking
two or three weeks. We can manage them. But there are members of Parliament whom
we can't control and they would make so much trouble that we would all have to
resign."
"Yet it seems to me," I rejoined, "that you could get these members together,
explain to them the necessity of keeping the United States out of the war, and
that they would be convinced. The trouble is that you Germans don't understand
conditions in my country. You don't think that the United States will fight. You
don't understand President Wilson; you think that he is an idealist and a peace
man, and that, under no circumstances, will he take up arms. You are making the
greatest and most costly mistake that any nation could make. The President has
two sides to his nature. Do not forget that he has Scotch-Irish blood in him. Up
to the present you have seen only the Scotch side of him. That makes him very
cautious, makes him weigh every move, makes him patient and long-suffering. But
he has also all the fire and combativeness of the Irish. Let him once set his
jaws and it takes a crowbar to open them again. If he once decides to fight, he
will fight with all his soul and to the bitter end. You can go just so far with
your provocations but no farther. You are also greatly deceived because certain
important members of Congress, perhaps even a member of the Cabinet, have been
for peace. But there is one man who is going to settle this matter---that is the
President. He will settle it as he thinks right and just, irrespective of what
other people may say or do."
Von Jagow said that I had given him a new impression of the President. But he
still had one more reason to believe that the United States would not go to war.
"How about the German-Americans?" he asked.
"I can tell you all about them," I answered, "because I am one of them myself. I
was born in Germany and spent the first nine years of my life here. I have
always loved many things German, such as its music and its literature. But my
parents left this country because they were dissatisfied and unhappy here. The
United States gave us a friendly reception and a home, and made us prosperous
and happy. There are many millions just like us; there is no business
opportunity and no social position that is not open to us. I do not believe that
there is a more contented people in the world than the German-Americans." I
could not reveal to him my own state of mind, as I was still ambassador, but I
could and did say:
"Take my own children. Their sympathies all through this war have been with
England and her allies. My son is here with me; he tells me that, if the United
States goes to war, he will enlist immediately. Do you suppose, in case we
should go to war with Germany, that they would side with you? The idea is simply
preposterous. And the overwhelming mass of German-Americans feel precisely the
same way."
"But I am told," said Von Jagow, "that there will be an insurrection of
German-Americans if your country makes war on us."
"Dismiss any such idea from your mind," I replied.
The first one who attempts it will be punished so promptly and so drastically
that such a movement will not go far. And I think that the loyal
German-Americans themselves will be the first to administer such punishment."
"We wish to avoid a rupture with the United States," said Von Jagow. "But we
must have time to change public sentiment here. There are two parties here,
holding diametrically opposed views on submarine warfare. One believes in
pushing it to the limit, irrespective of consequences to the United States or
any other power. The present Cabinet takes the contrary view; we wish to meet
the contentions of your President., But the militaristic faction is pushing us
hard. They will force us out of office if we declare the Lusitania sinking
illegal or improper. I think that President Wilson should understand this. We
are working with him, but we must go cautiously. I should suppose that Mr.
Wilson, since he wishes to avoid a break, would prefer to have us in power. Why
should he take a stand that will drive us out of office and put in here men who
will make war inevitable between Germany and the United States?"
"Do you wish Washington to understand," I asked, ,"that your tenure of office
depends on your not making this declaration?"
"We certainly do," replied Von Jagow. "I wish that you would telegraph
Washington to that effect. Tell the President that, if we are displaced now, we
shall be succeeded by men who advocate unlimited submarine warfare."
He expressed himself as amazed at my description of President Wilson and his
willingness to fight. "We regard him," said Von Jagow, "as absolutely a man of
peace. Nor do we believe that the American people will fight. They are far from
the scene of action, and, what, after all, have they to fight for? Your material
interests are not affected."
"But there is one thing that we will fight for," I replied, "and that is moral
principle. It is quite apparent that you do not understand the American spirit.
You do not realize that. we are holding off, not because we have no desire to
fight, but because we wish to be absolutely fair. We first wish to have all the
evidence in. I admit that we are reluctant to mix in foreign disputes, but we
shall insist upon our right to use the ocean as we see fit and we don't propose
to have Germany constantly interfering with that right and murdering our
citizens. The American is still perhaps a great powerful youth, but once he gets
his mind made up that he is going to defend his rights, he will do so
irrespective of consequences. You seem to think that Americans will not fight
for a principle; you apparently have forgotten that all our wars have been over
matters of principle. Take the greatest of them all ---the Civil War, from 1861
to '65. We in the North fought to emancipate the slaves; that was purely a
matter of principle; our material interests were not involved. And we fought
that to the end, although we had to fight our own brothers."
"We don't want to be on bad terms with the United States," Von Jagow replied.
"There are three nations on whom the peace of the world depends---England, the
United States, and Germany. We three should get together, establish peace, and
maintain it. I thank you for your explanation; I understand the situation much
better now. But I still don't see why your Government is so hard on Germany and
so easy with England." I made the usual explanation that we regarded our problem
with each nation as a distinct matter and could not make our treatment of
Germany in any way conditional on our treatment of England.
"Oh, yes," replied Von Jagow, rather plaintively.
"It reminds me of two boys playing in a yard. One is to be punished first and
the other is waiting for his turn. Wilson is going to spank the German boy
first, and, after he gets through, then he proposes to take up England."
"However," he concluded, "I wish you would cable the President that you have
gone over the matter with me and now understand the German point of view. Won't
you please ask him to do nothing until you have reached the other side and
explained the whole thing personally?
I made this promise, and Mr. Gerard and I cabled immediately.
At four-thirty o'clock I had an engagement to take tea with Dr. Alexander and
his wife at their home. I had been there about fifteen minutes when Zimmermann
was announced! He was a different kind of man from Von Jagow. He impressed me as
much stronger, mentally and physically. He was tall, even stately in his
bearing, masterful in his manner, direct and searching in his questions, but
extremely pleasing and insinuating.
Zimmermann, discussing the German-American situation, began with a statement
which I presume he thought would be gratifying to me. He told me how splendidly
the Jews had behaved in Germany during the war and how deeply under obligations
the Germans felt to them.
"After the war," he said, "they are going to be much better treated in Germany
than they have been."
Zimmermann told me that Von Jagow had told him about our talk and asked me to
repeat part of it. He was particularly interested, he said, in my statements
about the German-Americans, and he wished to learn from me himself the facts
upon which I based my conclusions. Like most Germans, he regarded the Germanic
elements in our population as almost a part of Germany.
"Are you sure that the mass of German-Americans would be loyal to the United
States in case of war?" he asked. "Aren't their feelings for the Fatherland
really dominant? "
"You evidently regard those German-Americans as a. distinct part of the
population," I replied, "living apart from the rest of the people and having
very little to do with American life as a whole. You could not make a greater
mistake. You can purchase a few here and there who will make a big noise and
shout for Germany, but I am talking about the millions of Americans of German
ancestry. These people regard themselves as Americans and nothing else. The
second generation particularly resent being looked upon as Germans. It is
practically impossible to make them talk German; they refuse to speak anything
but English. They do not read German newspapers and will not go to German
schools. They even resent going to Lutheran churches where the language is
German. We have more than a million German-Americans in New York City, but it
has been a great struggle to keep alive one German theatre; the reason is that
these people prefer the theatres where English is the language. We have a few
German clubs, but their membership is very small. The German-Americans prefer to
belong to the clubs of general membership and there is not a single one in New
York, even the finest, where they are not received upon their merits. In the
political and social life of New York there are few German-Americans who, as
such, have acquired any prominent position, though there are plenty of men of
distinguished position who are German in origin. If the United States and
Germany go to war, you will not only be surprised at the loyalty of our German
people, but the whole world will be. Another point; if the United States goes
in, we shall fight to the end, and it will be a very long and a very determined
struggle."
After three years I have no reason to be ashamed of either of these prophecies.
I sometimes wonder what Zimmermann now think of my statements.
After the explanation Zimmermann began to talk about Turkey. He seemed
interested to find out whether the Turks were likely to make a separate, peace.
I bluntly told him that the Turks felt themselves to be under no obligations to
the Germans. This gave me another opportunity.
"I have learned a good deal about German methods in Turkey," I said. "I think it
would be a great mistake to attempt similar tactics in the United States. I
speak of this because there has been a good deal of sabotage there already. This
in itself is solidifying the German-Americans against you and is more than
anything else driving the United States into the arms of England."
"But the German Government is not responsible," said Zimmermann. "We know
nothing about it."
Of course I could not accept that statement on its face value---recent
developments have shown how mendacious it was---but we passed to other topics.
The matter of the submarine came up again.
"We have voluntarily interned our navy," said Zimmermann. "We can do nothing at
sea except with our submarines. It seems to me that the United States is making
a serious mistake in so strongly opposing the submarine. You have a long coast
line and you may need the U-boat yourself some day. Suppose one of the European
Powers, or particularly Japan, should attack you. You could use the submarine to
good purpose then. Besides, if you insist on this proposed declaration in the
Lusitania matter, you will simply force our government into the hands of the
Tirpitz party."
Zimmermann now returned again to the situation in Turkey. His questions showed
that he was much displeased with the new German Ambassador, Graf
Wolf-Metternich. Metternich, it seemed, had failed in his attempt to win the
good will of the ruling powers in Turkey and had been a trial to the German
Foreign Office. Metternich had shown a different attitude toward the Armenians
from Wangenheim, and he had made sincere attempts with Talaat and Enver to stop
the massacres. Zimmermann now told me that Metternich had made a great mistake
in doing this and had destroyed his influence at Constantinople. Zimmermann made
no effort to conceal his displeasure over Metternich's manifestation of a
humanitarian spirit. I now saw that Wangenheim had really represented the
attitude of official Berlin, and I thus had confirmation, from the highest
German authority, of my conviction that Germany had acquiesced in those
deportations.
In a few days we had taken the steamer at Copenhagen, and, on February 22, 1916,
I found myself once more sailing into New York harbour---and home.
THE END
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TABLE OF CONTENTS  Introduction
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Chapter XI
Chapter XII
Chapter XIII
Chapter XIV
Chapter XV
Chapter XVI
Chapter XVII
Chapter XVIII
Chapter XIX
Chapter XX
Chapter XXI
Chapter XXII
Chapter XXIII
Chapter XXIV
Chapter XXV
Chapter XXVI
Chapter XXVII
Chapter XXVIII
Chapter XXIX
PLACE YOUR ORDER
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