AMBASSADOR MORGENTHAU'S STORY
CHAPTER XXI
BULGARIA ON THE AUCTION BLOCK
The failure of the Allied fleet at the Dardanelles did not definitely settle,
the fate of Constantinople. Naturally the Turks and the Germans felt immensely
relieved when the fleet sailed away. But they were by no means entirely easy in
their minds. The most direct road to the ancient capital still remained
available to their enemies.
In early September, 1915, one of the most influential Germans in the city gave
me a detailed explanation of the prevailing military situation. He summed up the
whole matter in the single phrase:
"We cannot hold the Dardanelles without the military support of Bulgaria."
This meant, of course, that unless Bulgaria aligned herself with Turkey and the
Central Empires, the Gallipoli expedition would succeed, Constantinople would
fall, the Turkish Empire would collapse, Russia would be reestablished as an
economic and military power, and the war, in a comparatively brief period, would
terminate in a victory for the Entente. Not improbably the real neutrality of
Bulgaria would have had the same result. It is thus perhaps not too much to say
that, in September and October of 1915, the Bulgarian Government held the
duration of the war in its hands.
This fact is of such preeminent importance that I call hardly emphasize it too
strongly. I suggest that my readers take down the map of a part of the world
with which they are not very familiar---that of the Balkan States, as determined
by the Treaty of Bucharest. All that remains of European Turkey is a small
irregular area stretching about one hundred miles west of Constantinople. The
nation whose land is contiguous to European Turkey is Bulgaria. The main
railroad line to Western Europe starts at Constantinople and runs through
Bulgaria, by way of Adrianople, Philippopolis, and Sofia. At that time Bulgaria
could muster an army of 500,000 well-trained, completely organized troops.
Should these once start marching toward Constantinople, there was practically
nothing to bar their way. Turkey had a considerable army, it is true, but it was
then finding plenty of employment repelling the Allied forces at the Dardanelles
and the Russians in the Caucasus. With Bulgaria hostile, Turkey could obtain
neither troops nor munitions from Germany. Turkey would have been completely
isolated and, under the pounding of Bulgaria, would have disappeared as a
military force, and as a European state, in one very brief campaign.
I wish to direct particular attention to this railroad, for it was, after all,
the main strategic prize for which Germany was contending. After leaving Sofia
it crosses northeastern Serbia, the most important stations being at Nish and
Belgrade. From the latter point it crosses the River Save and later the River
Danube, and thence pursues its course to Budapest and Vienna and thence to
Berlin. Practically all the military operations that took place in the Balkans
in 1915-16 had for their ultimate object the possession of this road. Once
holding this line Turkey and Germany would no longer be separated; economically
and militarily they would become a unit. The Dardanelles, as I have described,
was the link that connected Russia with her allies; with this passage closed
Russia's collapse rapidly followed. The valleys of the Morava and the Maritza,
in which this railroad is laid, constituted for Turkey a kind of waterless
Dardanelles. In her possession it gave her access to her allies; in the
possession of her enemies, the Ottoman Empire would go to pieces. Only the
accession of Bulgaria to the Teutonic cause could give the Turks and Germans
this advantage. As soon as Bulgaria entered, that section of the railroad
extending to the Serbian frontier would at once become available. If Bulgaria
joined the Central Powers as an active participant, the conquest of Serbia would
inevitably follow, and this would give the link extending from Nish to Belgrade
to the Teutonic powers. Thus the Bulgarian alliance would make Constantinople a
suburb of Berlin, place all the resources of the Krupps at the disposal of the
Turkish army, make inevitable the failure of the Allied attack on Gallipoli, and
lay the foundation of that Oriental Empire which had been for thirty years the
mainspring of German policy.
It is thus apparent what my German friend meant when, in early September, he
said that, "without Bulgaria we cannot hold the Dardanelles." Everybody sees
this so clearly now that there is a prevalent belief that Germany had arranged
this Bulgarian alliance before the outbreak of the war. On this point I have no
definite knowledge. That the Bulgarian king and the Kaiser may have arranged
this cooperation in advance is not unlikely. But we must not make the mistake of
believing that this settled the matter, for the experience of the last few years
shows us that treaties are not to be taken too seriously. Whether there was an
understanding or not, I know that the Turkish officials and the Germans by no
means regarded it as settled that Bulgaria would take their side. In their talks
with me they constantly showed the utmost apprehension over the outcome; and at
one time the fear was general that Bulgaria would take the side of the Entente.
I had my first personal contact with the Bulgarian negotiations in the latter
part of May, when I was informed that M. Koloucheff, the Bulgarian Minister, had
notified Robert College that the Bulgarian students could not remain until the
end of the college year, but would have to return home by June 5th. The
Constantinople College for Women had also received word that all the Bulgarian
girls must return at the same time. Both these American institutions had many
Bulgarian students, in most cases splendid representatives of their country; it
is through these colleges, indeed, that the distant United States and Bulgaria
had established such friendly relations. But they had never had such an
experience before.
Everybody was discussing the meaning of this move., It seemed quite apparent.
The chief topic of conversation at that time was Bulgaria. Would she enter the
war? If so, on which side would she cast her fortunes? One day it was reported
that she would join the Entente; the next day that she had decided to ally
herself with the Central Powers. The prevailing belief was that she was actively
bargaining with both sides and looking for the highest terms. Should Bulgaria go
with the Entente, however, it would be undesirable to have any Bulgarian
subjects marooned in Turkey. As the boys and girls in the American colleges
usually came from important Bulgarian families---one of them was the daughter of
General Ivanoff, who led the Bulgarian armies in the Balkan wars---the Bulgarian
Government might naturally have a particular interest in their safety.
The conclusion reached by most people was that Bulgaria had decided to take the
side of the Entente. The news rapidly spread throughout Constantinople. The
Turks were particularly impressed. Dr. Patrick, President of Constantinople
College for Women, arranged a hurried commencement for her Bulgarian students,
which I attended. It was a sad occasion, more like a funeral than the festivity
that usually took place.
I found the Bulgarian girls almost immediately, most in a hysterical state; they
all believed that war was coming and that they were being bundled home merely to
prevent them from failing into the clutches of the Turks. My sympathies were so
aroused that we brought them down to the American Embassy, where we all spent a
delightful evening. After dinner the girls dried their eyes and entertained us
by singing many of their beautiful Bulgarian songs, and what had started as a
mournful day thus had a happy ending. Next morning the girls all left for
Bulgaria.
A few weeks afterward the Bulgarian Minister told me that the Government had
summoned the students home merely for political effect. There was no immediate
likelihood of war, he said. But Bulgaria wished Germany and Turkey to understand
that there was still a chance that she might join the Entente. Bulgaria, as all
of us suspected, was apparently on the auction block. The one fixed fact in the
Bulgarian position was the determination to have Macedonia. Everything, said
Koloucheff, depended upon that. His conversations reflected the general
Bulgarian view that Bulgaria had fairly won this territory in the first Balkan
war, that the Powers had unjustly permitted her to be deprived of it, that it
was Bulgarian by race, language, and tradition, and that there could be no
permanent peace in the Balkans until it was returned to its rightful possessors.
But Bulgaria insisted on more than a promise, to be redeemed after the war was
over; she demanded immediate occupation. Once Macedonia were turned over to
Bulgaria, she would join her forces to those of the Entente. There were two
great prizes in the game then being played in the Balkans: one was Macedonia,
which Bulgaria must have; and the other Constantinople, which Russia was
determined to get. Bulgaria was entirely willing that Russia should have
Constantinople if she herself could obtain Macedonia.
I was given to understand that the Bulgarian General Staff had plans all
completed for the capture of Constantinople, and that they had shown these plans
to the Entente. Their programme called for a Bulgarian army of about 300,000 men
who would besiege Constantinople twenty-three days from the time the signal to
start should be given. But promises of Macedonia would not suffice; the
Bulgarian must have possession.
Bulgaria recognized the difficulties of the Allied position. She did not believe
that Serbia and Greece would voluntarily surrender Macedonia, nor did she
believe that the Allies would dare to take this country away from them by force.
In that event, she thought that there was a danger that Serbia might make a
separate peace with the Central Powers. On the other hand, Bulgaria would object
if Serbia received Bosnia and Herzegovina as compensation for the loss of
Macedonia---she felt that an enlarged Serbia would be a constant menace to her,
and hence a future menace to peace in the Balkans. Thus the situation was
extremely difficult and complicated.
One of the best-informed men in Turkey was Paul Weitz, the correspondent of the
Frankfurter Zeitung. Weitz was more than a journalist; he had spent thirty years
in Constantinople; he had the most intimate personal knowledge of Turkish
affairs, and he was the confidant and adviser of the German Embassy. His duties
there were actually semi-diplomatic. Weitz had really been one of the most
successful agencies in the German penetration of Turkey; it was common talk that
he knew every important man in the Turkish Empire, the best way to approach him,
and his price. I had several talks with Weitz about Bulgaria during those
critical August and early September days. He said many times that it was not at
all certain that she would join her forces with Germany. Yet on September 7th
Weitz came to me with important news. The situation had changed over night.
Baron Neurath, the Conseiller of the German Embassy at Constantinople, had gone
to Sofia, and, as a result of his visit, an agreement had been signed that would
make Bulgaria Germany's ally.
Germany, said Weitz, had won over Bulgaria by doing something which the Entente
had not been able and willing to do. It had secured her the possession at once
of a piece of coveted territory. Serbia had refused to give Bulgaria immediate
possession of Macedonia; Turkey, on the other hand, had now surrendered a piece
of the Ottoman Empire. The amount of land in question, it is true, was
apparently insignificant, yet it had great strategic advantages and represented
a genuine sacrifice by Turkey. The Maritza River, a few miles north of Enos,
bends to the east, to the north, and then to the west again, creating a block of
territory, with an area of nearly 1,000 square miles, including the important
cities of Demotica, Kara Agatch, and half of Adrianople. What makes this land
particularly important is that it contains about fifty miles of the railroad
which runs from Dedeagatch to Sofia. All this railroad, that is, except this
fifty miles, is laid in Bulgarian territory; this short strip, extending through
Turkey, cuts Bulgaria's communications with the Mediterranean. Naturally
Bulgaria yearned for this piece of land; and Turkey now handed it over to her.
This cession changed the whole Balkan situation and it made Bulgaria an ally of
Turkey and the Central Powers. Besides the railroad, Bulgaria obtained that part
of Adrianople which lay west of the Maritza River. In addition, of course,
Bulgaria was to receive Macedonia, as soon as that province could be occupied by
Bulgaria and her allies.
I vividly remember the exultation of Weitz when this agreement was signed.
"It's all settled," he told me. "Bulgaria has decided to join us. It was all
arranged last night at Sofia."
The Turks also were greatly relieved. For the first time they saw the way out of
their troubles. The Bulgarian arrangement, Enver told me, had taken a tremendous
weight off their minds.
"We Turks are entitled to the credit," he said, "of bringing Bulgaria in on the
side of the Central Powers. She would never have come to our assistance if we
hadn't given her that slice of land. By surrendering it immediately and not
waiting till the end of the war, we showed our good faith. It was very hard for
us to do it, of course, especially to give up part of the city of Adrianople,
but it was worth the price. We really surrendered this territory in exchange for
Constantinople, for if Bulgaria had not come in on our side, we would have lost
this city. Just think how enormously we have improved our position. We have had
to keep more than 200,000 men at the Bulgarian frontier, to protect us against
any possible attack from that quarter. We can now transfer all these troops to
the Gallipoli peninsula, and thus make it absolutely impossible that the Allies'
expedition can succeed. We are also greatly hampered at the Dardanelles by the
lack of ammunition. But Bulgaria, Austria, and Germany are to make a joint
attack on Serbia and will completely control that country in a few weeks. So we
shall have a direct railroad line from Constantinople into Austria and Germany
and can get all the war supplies which we need. With Bulgaria on our side no
attack can be made on Constantinople from the north---we have created an
impregnable bulwark against Russia. I do not deny that the situation had caused
us great anxiety. We were afraid that Greece and Bulgaria would join hands, and
that would also bring in Rumania. Then Turkey would have been lost; they would
have had us between a pair of pincers. But now we have only one task before us,
that is to drive the English and French at the Dardanelles into the sea. With
all the soldiers and all the ammunition which we need, we shall do this in a
very short time. We gave up a small area because we saw that that was the way to
win the war."
The outcome justified Enver's prophecies in almost every detail. Three months
after Bulgaria accepted the Adrianople bribe, the Entente admitted defeat and
withdrew its forces from the Dardanelles; and, with this withdrawal, Russia,
which was the greatest potential source of strength to the Allied cause and the
country which, properly organized and supplied, might have brought the Allies a
speedy triumph, disappeared as a vital factor in the war. When the British and
French withdrew from Gallipoli that action turned adrift this huge hulk of a
country to flounder to anarchy, dissolution, and ruin.
The Germans celebrated this great triumph in a way that was characteristically
Teutonic. In their minds, January 17, 1916, stands out as one of the big dates
in the war. There was great rejoicing in Constantinople, for the first Balkan
express---or, as the Germans called it, the Balkanzug---was due to arrive that
afternoon! The railroad station was decorated with flags and flowers, and the
whole German and Austrian population of Constantinople, including the Embassy
staffs, assembled to welcome the incoming train. As it finally rolled into the
station, thousands of "hochs " went up from as many raucous throats.
Since that January 17, 1916, the Balkanzug has ran regularly from. Berlin to
Constantinople. The Germans believe that it is as permanent a feature of the new
Germanic Empire as the line from Berlin to Hamburg.
Continue >
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TABLE OF CONTENTS  Introduction
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Chapter XI
Chapter XII
Chapter XIII
Chapter XIV
Chapter XV
Chapter XVI
Chapter XVII
Chapter XVIII
Chapter XIX
Chapter XX
Chapter XXI
Chapter XXII
Chapter XXIII
Chapter XXIV
Chapter XXV
Chapter XXVI
Chapter XXVII
Chapter XXVIII
Chapter XXIX
PLACE YOUR ORDER
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